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A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS

PERSECUTION: CASTING UP A DREAD BALANCE
SHEET
R. George Wright *
I. INTRODUCTION

The worst forms of religious persecution are unfathomably horrific. American law has extinguished the most severe forms of
classical' and modern2 public religious persecution. Whether other forms of public religious persecution have been reduced, or are
instead on the increase, is controversial and undoubtedly important.3 This particular question, as briefly illustrated below, is
unfortunately not subject to any reasoned, consensual resolution.
It should come as no surprise when commentators raise largely
unresolvable claims as to the existence of public persecution or of

*
Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law; J.D., 1982, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; Ph.D., 1976,
Indiana University; A.B., 1972, University of Virginia. The author's thanks are hereby extended to Samantha Everett and Angela Stackhouse. The subtitle of this article is adapted
from Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons: Their Finest
Hour (June 18, 1940), in THE INTERNET HISTORY SOURCEROOK (Paul Halsall ed., 1998),
http://www.fordham.edu/HALSALLfMOD/1940churchill-finest.html
[hereinafter Their
Finest Hour].
1. See, e.g., PAUL MIDDLETON, MARTYRDOM: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED chs. 2-4
(2011) (discussing persecution and martyrdom in early Christianity).
2. For discussion of martyrdom in general and the guillotine in particular under the
French Revolution, see, for example, THOMAS CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A
HISTORY 648-49 (1934) (1837) (describing mass clerical drownings); WILLIAM DOYLE, THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 258-63 (1989) (discussing intimidation and
punishment of Christians); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE ANCIEN RtGIME AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 15-18 (Jon Elstered ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2011) (1856).
The novel serving as the inspiration for Francis Poulenc's opera "Dialogues of the Carmel-

ites" is

GERTRUD VON LE FORT, THE SONG AT THE SCAFFOLD: A NOVEL OF HORROR AND

HOLINESS IN THE REIGN OF TERROR (Sophia Inst. Press 2001) (1933).
3. See infra Section III.
4. See infra Section II.B.
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the burdening of religious rights of conscience, doctrine, and practice.'
This article does not offer a formula for consensually resolving
controversial cases of what counts as religious persecution. Instead, the article intends to draw the attention of legislatures,
agencies, and the courts to an important but almost entirely neglected basic consideration in addressing alleged religious persecution. The crucial point is this: Many instances of alleged religious persecution confer immense, judicially cognizable benefits,
from the standpoint of many of the victims themselves, on many
parties, including those victims. These extensive benefits may coexist alongside the obvious and undeniable costs. It can be fully
legitimate for legislatures and courts to take these immense, if
not infinite, benefits, especially those conferred upon the presumed victims themselves, into account in adopting or adjudicating claims over the relevant policies.
Thus, in many cases, it will be constitutionally proper for a
court to consider the distinctive benefits as well as the costs of the
alleged persecution, both from the perspective of the victims. This
is not only a matter of calculating utilities of the alternative policies, but also of genuinely respecting the dignity and responsibility of all competent, reflective persons. Surprisingly, a court could
in some cases legitimately conclude, after an appropriate and
broadly defined cost-benefit analysis,' that the benefits of the al-

5. Setting aside Establishment Clause issues and a number of complications, typical
Free Exercise Clause and some other religious rights claims might be adjudicated under a
combination of the following cases and statutes, all of which prove to be far from selfexplanatory: Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1 to bb-4 (2006), substantially limited by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
512 (1997); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 804
(2006), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 to cc-5, construed in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712
(2005); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (discussing religious rights and the ministerial exception as an affirmative defense to EEOC claims);
Christian Legal Soc'y of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (discussing free
exercise in the context of student religious organizations).
6. For an introduction to mainstream cost-benefit analysis literature, see, for example, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (offering a collection of essays on cost-benefit
analysis); E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1988) (offering
cost.benefit analysis hypotheticals); Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, HappinessResearch
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 8253 (2008) (applying subject well-being research to cost-benefit analysis).
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leged persecution to the victims and others, given the victims'
own genuine beliefs and values, outweigh the costs.'
Alleged persecution, it turns out, need not be a zero-sum or
negative sum activity. The victims, the government, and the society may all be net gainers from some instances of real or perceived persecution. Of course, such a broadly defined cost-benefit
analysis must be undertaken with restraint, modesty, sensitivity,
sophistication, integrity, creativity, intellectual humility, and a
resistance to crude quantification. A cost-benefit analysis of alleged religious persecution should recognize that not every moral,
religious, or legal value is reducible to some form8 of crude utility.' Rights may certainly transcend narrow utility calculations. 0
7. This is not to suggest that any familiar religious group is bound by its own logic
not only to endure, accept, or welcome unsought persecution, but to actively cultivate, intentionally provoke, or specifically demand its own persecution. For many, avidly sought
or easily avoidable persecution may not qualify as genuine persecution at all. See in/ra
Section IV.
Nor could government have a constitutional duty or even a right to engage in religious
persecution merely for the sake of religious persecution, in response to a religious demand
for persecution by its initiative-taking victims, or for the sake of any distinctly religious
benefits of persecution. All of these cases would seem to violate the Establishment Clause,
at least as understood by the Supreme Court of the United States. See, e.g., Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (discussing the necessity for government practices to
have significant secular purposes and effects). These cases also seem to press the bounds
of the public accommodation of distinctively religious belief.
Finally, victims of alleged religious persecution often may believe that acts of persecution damage or even jeopardize the souls of the unrepenting persecutors, but it is unlikely
that a court would factor such considerations into account, given that the alleged persecutors would most typically have no inclination to accept such a belief, Establishment Clause
problems aside.
8. For a discussion of the murky indeterminacy of the idea of utility and its maximization, see David Lyons, The Moral Opacity of Utilitarianism,in MORALITY, RULES, AND
CONSEQUENCES: A CRITICAL READER 105 (Brad Hooker et al. eds., 2000).
9. For a classic discussion of utilitarianism, see HENRY SIDGWICK, METHODS OF
ETHICS bk. iv (7th ed. 1907) (1874). For a well-known defense and critique of utilitarianism, see J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
For further discussion, see, for example, DAVID WIGGINS, ETHICS: TWELVE LECTURES ON
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORALITY chs. 6-8 (2006) (discussing classical utilitarianism, a fresh
argument for utilitarianism, and the consequentialist argument).
10. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch.7 (1977) (discussing the
difficulty of determining the breadth of Americans' individual rights); SMART & WILLIAMS,
supra note 9, at 77 (introducing Williams's critique of utilitarianism). For a sense, though,
that focusing on consequences and rights-claims actually leads more to convergence and
compatibility than to opposition and conflict. See, e.g., 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT
MATTERS pts. 2-3 (2011) (discussing the theories of universal laws and the consequentialist principles upon which they rely); David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, 100
ETHICS 586, 588 (1990) (outlining the benefits in consequentialism). For the sharply contrasting view that "[a]s a general strategy of moral reasoning, utilitarianism or consequentialism is irrational," see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL BIGHTS 112 (1980).
For discussion of the problems and possibilities of somehow reasonably comparing conflict-
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Courts and legislatures ordinarily should not insensitively decide
alleged religious persecution issues solely on the basis of any unduly narrow cost-benefit analysis.
But contested claims of right, religious or otherwise, can hardly
stand or fall without reference to the meaning and consequences
of their recognition or denial, including their major costs and
benefits. Costs and benefits, of various sorts, must inevitably inform any sensible adjudication of a claimed religious right. Ignoring major costs and benefits from the alleged victims' own authentic perspective is not necessary in order to comply with the
Establishment Clause," and disregarding the victims' own basic
beliefs and value-choices would deny them elemental human dignity. For a government to acknowledge a group's values is not to
endorse those values.
If the courts are to sensibly decide cases of alleged religious
persecution, they must crucially consider the clear, basic, relevant beliefs and values of the affected parties, as well as the
broader consequences of the possible judicial outcomes. The beliefs and values of the victims of alleged religious persecution
should not be assessed on their merits or for their truth by the
State. The legitimacy of motivation for holding religious beliefs
should also generally not be questioned. That would indeed raise
Establishment Clause issues.
But such beliefs and values may well translate directly into
costs and crucial benefits on the victims' own accounting that
judges may legitimately consider to resolve such cases.'" The diging claims of interests, goods, and rights, see, for example, Symposium, When Is a Line as
Long as a Rock Is Heavy? Reconciling Public Values and Private Rights in Constitutional
Adjudication, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 707-1120 (1994) (reviewing the Supreme Court's attempts at comparing the "lengthiness of individual liberties with the weightiness of public
values"); R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as Easy) as They
Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 355-56 (2001) (noting that incommensurability need not preclude a reasonable analysis); see also infra note 43 (discussing commensurabilities of infinite values).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. For a well-recognized instance in which the Supreme Court balanced interests by
incorporating the evident spiritual values and religious beliefs of the directly affected religious group, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). While the focus of this article will, for the sake of convenience, be on case law adjudication, the basic logic of the article extends to the drafting and enforcement of statutes and even to many instances of
private individual or group decision-making as well. The article does not, however, make
social predictions or offer strategic or tactical advice to any group. Thus, the article does
not address, for example, whether religious groups should on their own principles seek
downsized, more knowledgeable, and more fervent, but perhaps less publicly visible or
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nity and moral seriousness of the victims, as well as the desire for
optimal government policies, require no less. Religious beliefs can
be considered as beliefs without officially approving or disapproving of such beliefs on the merits.
This article applies such considerations below to surprising effect. In many instances, it turns out, serious alleged religious persecution may have unique and immense, if not infinite, legally
cognizable benefits for the victims of persecution, and perhaps for
others. In particular, the highest and fullest development, selfrealization, or self-actualization of persecuted groups may by
their own standards often count as a judicially cognizable public
interest. In such cases, it will be perfectly reasonable for courts,
legislatures, and administrative agencies to take such benefits into account in policymaking and adjudication.
II. SOME BASIC BACKGROUND: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
ALLEGED PERSECUTION

A. The Idea of Alleged Persecution
It may be tempting for a mainstream religious denomination to
downplay the likelihood of its own persecution by courts, legislatures, or other important public or private entities and groups.
But as Professor Mark Tushnet has observed, "even those to
whom the State is presently friendly should know that they will
be disappointed in the State someday. ... [T]o be a believer is al-

ways to have your heart broken by the State.'

3

Religion in general, apart from any particular denominational
beliefs, practices, or lapses, is not without its contemporary academic detractors. 4 The proper role, if any, of religious discourse

even clandestine, memberships or activities, under any circumstances. For one such policy
vision, see ROSS DOUTHAT, BAD RELIGION: How WE BECAME A NATION OF HERETICS
(2012).
13. Mark Tushnet, In Praiseof Martyrdom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1123-24 (1999).
14. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006); DANIEL C. DENNETT,
BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON (2006); A.C. GRAYLING,
AGAINST ALL GODS: SIX POLEMICS ON RELIGION AND AN ESSAY ON KINDNESS (2007); SAM
HARRIS, LETTER TO A CHRISTIAN NATION (2006); CHRISTOPHER HITCHENs, GOD Is NOT
GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING (2007); LAWRENCE M. KRAUSS, A UNIVERSE
FROM NOTHING: WHY THERE IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING (2012); ALEX
ROSENBERG, THE ATHEIST'S GUIDE TO REALITY: ENJOYING LIFE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS
(2011); VICTOR J. STENGER, GOD: THE FAILED HYPOTHESIS: How SCIENCE SHOWS THAT
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in public discussions of the political and cultural issues of the day
is notoriously controversial. 5 It is increasingly important to have

some conception of the alleged "persecution" of religion and related ideas and to notice how such terms might be differently used
by opposing groups.

For the purposes of this article, the idea of religious persecution seems to generally require an absence of sufficient justifica-

tion for the alleged oppression. Burdening of religion hardly
counts as persecution if it is plainly justified by the need to secure
some crucial and otherwise unattainable public interest. But religious persecution need not involve actual subjective hostility, an
ongoing organized campaign, or any particular degree of success
in exacting compliant behavior from those allegedly being persecuted. It also seems clear that persecution need not be unlawful
in order to count as persecution." A constitutional amendment
limiting the free exercise of religion (and equal protection) along
with a series of severe burdens imposed on a particular religious

group, for example, might be both lawful and persecution. 6
As for some related terminology, one might think of the idea of
"martyrdom" as an exceptionally severe form of persecution, often
involving an uncompromising victim response. The word "martyr," however, originally referred merely to public witnesses to re-

GOD DOES NOT EXIST (2008).
15. See, for example, the important discussions in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1996) and John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 765 (1997). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 127
(1980); ROBERT AUDI, RATIONALITY AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT (2011); ROBERT AUDI &
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1997); CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2004); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS
AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (2010); RELIGION IN THE LIBERAL POLITY (Terence Cuneo ed., 2005); STEVEN
D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE (2010); MARY WARNOCK,
DISHONEST TO GOD (2010); Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 236 (1987).
16. While "persecution" could be defined in any number of ways for various particular
purposes, these assumptions should serve the purposes of the discussion to follow. One
crucial point, though, is that even intentional persecution may benefit its victims on the
victims' own value scheme.
17. Contra James Bridge, Persecution, 11 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (Kevin Knight ed.
2009) (1911), available at www.newadvent.org/cathenrll703a.htm.
18. One can imagine, for further example, a pogrom hypothetically in accord with
Czarist law. See generally Yehuda Slutsky, Pogroms, ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA (2008),
available at www.jewishvirtualllibrary.org/source/judaica (explaining that a program is
"an attack accompanied by destruction, looting of property, murder, and rape, perpetuated
by one section of the population against another.').
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ligious events and beliefs, with no essential element of a severe
penalty for such witnessing."5 More importantly, "martyrdom" in
some other usages need not involve persecution unto death. Joan
of Arc apparently referred to her pain and suffering in prison as
itself amounting to martyrdom. And the distinction between "red
martyrs" who go to their death, and "white martyrs," whose persecution does not involve death, is well-established."'
At the other extreme, some unjustified violations even of constitutional free exercise rights clearly do not rise to the level of
persecution. Consider, for example, a statute with easily administered exceptions on religious and non-religious grounds which is
applied, to modest effect, against a religious group that is unknown to the government. Assume finally that the religious group
cannot point to any recognized statutory exception of which the
group might avail itself.22 Here, it seems, we could have a constitutional religious rights violation where the circumstances could
not justify any claim that the drafting or enforcement of the statute amounts to persecution.
Consider another important legal context occasionally involving claims of religious persecution: immigration. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the idea of persecution in asylum or refugee cases
tends to be interpreted narrowly. 2 Persecution in the American
immigration context, whether on religious grounds or not, is thus

19.

See Maurice Hassett, Martyr, 9 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (Kevin Knight ed. 2009)

(1910), available at www.newadvent.org/cathen/09736b.htm.
20. See The Trial of Joan of Arc, Eleventh Session, March 14 (W.S. Scott trans. 1956)

(1431), available at http://smu.eduLijas/l1431trial.html.
21. See, e.g., C6ilin Owens, A Literary Preamble, in RONA M. FIELDS, MARTYRDOM:
THE PSYCHOLOGY, THEOLOGY, AND POLITICS OF SELF-SACRIFICE 3, 4 (2004). Neither martyrdom in a broad sense nor persecution more generally need involve anything like the

application of torture, as that term is ordinarily understood. See, e.g., Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res.

39146, at 197, U.N. Doc. AIRES/39I46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (defining "torture"); Implementation
of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2012) (defining "torture");
Ghebrehiwot v. Att'y Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 2006) (clarifying the definition of
"torture" under the Convention Against Torture). On the other hand, torture can amount
under certain circumstances to persecution, even for immigration law purposes. See, e.g.,
Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268,

272, 275 (2d Cir. 2005)).
22. We may assume that the applicable law in this hypothetical case is confined to
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-85 (1990).
23. See, e.g., Eric T. Johnson, Religious Persecution:A Viable Basis For Seeking Refu-

gee Status in the United States?, 1996 BYU L. REV. 757, 758 (1996) ("Despite history, international instruments, and current events, religious persecution remains an infrequently granted basis for obtaining refugee status in the United States.").
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seen as "an extreme concept." 4 Generally, more is required than
incidents of official harassment, intimidation, or even "minor
physical abuse or brief detentions" on religious grounds. 5 Brief
detentions along with physical abuse may or may not suffice.26
Generally, "employment discrimination which stops short of depriving an individual of a means of earning a living does not constitute persecution."'" Heavy or onerous fines, 8 property confiscations,29 or broad limits on employment opportunity0 may,
however, suffice. And the successful concealment of one's religious membership, practices, or beliefs from the authorities does
not rule out a claim of religious persecution.'
The stringency of the idea of religious persecution in the immigration context may be analytically helpful for our purposes. A
cost-benefit analysis of alleged religious persecution plainly must
recognize the relevant differences between, for example, torture,
prolonged imprisonment, or strict martyrdom on the one hand,
and lesser forms of persecution on the other. But the extreme
cases, as in martyrdom, may clarify the costs as well as the cognizable benefits of lesser forms of persecution. Even a distorted
"visual" enlargement of any phenomenon may allow one to better
understand that phenomenon at a smaller and less readily visible
scale. 2 The lesser forms of religious persecution are not necessarily like martyrdom on a smaller scale. But the cases of martyrdom
may make it easier to more readily notice and evaluate some
genuine costs and benefits of lesser forms of religious persecution.

24. Kazemzadeb v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009).
25. Id. (citing Djonda v. U.S. Att'y Gem., 514 F.3d 1168, 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008)).
26. See the collected case discussion in Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General, 451 F.3d 1287,
1290-91 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 1291 (quoting Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
28. See Nai Yuan Jiang v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1086, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2010); Zhi Wei
Pang v. Holder, 665 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012). Compare the allegations cited infra
note 81.
29. See Zhi Wei Pang, 665 F.3d at 1231 (quoting In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 174
(B.I.A. 2007)).
30. See id. (quoting T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 174).
31.

See Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960-61 (7th Cir. 2004).

32.

Plato famously argues this idea in another context. See, e.g., JULIA ANNAS, AN

INTRODUCTION TO PLATO'S REPUBLIC 149-50 (1981); Norbert Blossner, The City.Soul
Analogy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO'S REPUBLIC 345, 366 (G.R.F. Ferrari
ed. & trans., 2007); TERENCE IRWIN, PLATO'S ETHICS 227 (1995).
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B. Alleged Persecutionand "EssentialContestedness"
One possible challenge to this analysis is important in many
other contexts but turns out to be largely irrelevant to the purposes herein. The core of this challenge is that governments and
other entities accused of engaging in religious persecution will
typically, with reason and good faith, deny that they are engaging
in persecution. The idea of persecution or of religious rightsviolation carries a normative as well as a descriptive element,
with the normative element typically making any genuine persecution morally unjustified and wrongful. Any government that believes its actions to be justified will be more likely to deny that it
is engaged in religious persecution at all than to say that its religious persecution is sufficiently justified. The government's focus
will instead be on its societal goals, with the related suffering as
an unfortunate or voluntarily incurred cost.
The victims of alleged religious persecution, however, are instead likely to focus primarily on the effects of government actions as they experience them. They are unlikely to have an initial sense of their own persecution but to then nevertheless
conclude that the government actually has a sufficient justification for its actions, so that what initially seemed to be religious"
persecution was in reality not persecution at all. The government
and the most directly affected parties will thus tend to systematically and irreconcilably differ as to what counts as persecution.
Partly, this may be a matter of propaganda and public relations.
As was observed more than a century ago, "[t]hough the persecuting spirit has not yet ceased to influence men's actions, it is no
longer" regarded as a trait to be proud of, but seeks to hide itself
under specious disguises."

33. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, links the idea of persecution to oppression and hostility, with their strongly negative connotations. See PersecutionDefinition, OED.coM, http://www.oed.comview/Entry141431 (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
34. It is certainly possible that the question of persecution may or may not be accompanied by uncertainty over whether the alleged persecution is on the grounds of religion,
or (also) on the grounds of race, ethnicity, citizenship, tribal affiliation, nationality, or other correlated considerations.
35. Again, it seems unlikely that most governments would admit to currently engaging in persecution in any sense linked to "oppression" rather than maintain that the governmental acts in question are justified and thus do not count as persecution, whatever
the costs or suffering involved.
36. John Fiske, The Philosophy of Persecution, 132 N. AM. REV. 1, 1 (1881).
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More basically, as the above discussion suggests, 'persecution'
is what the philosopher W.B. Gallie referred to as an "essentially
contested concept."37 For Gallie, disagreements over the core
meaning and central application of an essentially contested concept may not be "resolvable by argument of any kind, [but] are
nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and
evidence."3
Those subject to alleged persecution will naturally be inclined
to see their own religious principles, moral conceptions, constitutional free exercise rights, and other rights and obligations as
outweighing or simply overriding any conflicting government policy interests. Even where the government's intent is not perceived
even in part as hostile, surely it may be thought that some sort of
exemption should be viable, perhaps among other established exemptions.39
In contrast, the drafters of an unintentionally, perhaps unknowingly, religiously burdensome rule" will be more inclined to
focus on the rule's secular purposes, including the promotion of
basic rights; the weight of those purposes; the realistic impossibility of drafting a concise but religiously cost-free rule; and perhaps

37. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167 (1956); see also WILLIAM CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 10-44 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing Gallie's "essentially contested concepts'); John
Gray, On Liberty, Liberalism, and Essential Contestability, 8 BRIT.J. POL. SC. 385 (1978)
(considering whether the "central concepts of social and political thought have an essentially contestable character"); Alasdair MacIntyre, The Essential Contestability of Some
Social Concepts, 84 ETHICS 1 (1973) (addressing why questions concerning social concepts
elude decisive answers); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested
Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002) (discussing the essential contestability of
law as it related to the counting of votes in Florida for the 2000 U.S. presidential election).
38. Gallie, supra note 37, at 167-69. It is possible that the greater the degree of political and cultural polarization, the less likely we may be to notice that ideas such as "persecution" might be essentially contested. And in turn, perhaps our failure to notice the essential contestedness of such concepts may, at least in some minimal way, contribute to
further polarization. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD
PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION ch. 12 (2012) (discussing the extreme polarization of American politics in the twenty-first century).
39. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-82 (1990) (outlining case law addressing the meaning of one or more exemptions from an otherwise neutral rule of general applicability).
40. Consider a hypothetical religious sect that considers the rare and carefully controlled ingestion of heroin as a mandatory sacrament. See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK &
PETER DE MARNEFFE, THE LEGALIZATION OF DRUGS (2005) (discussing policy justifications
for and against legalizing heroin).
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the possibility of the burdened religious groups somehow adapting to the rule.41
The problem of addressing essentially contested concepts, even
where it is recognized, thus appears to be unresolvable. Fortunately for the purposes herein, the essential contestedness of
'persecution' and related ideas really does not directly matter. A
sensitive cost-benefit analysis of either real or merely alleged religious persecution can always start from the perspective of the
alleged victims. The cost-benefit analysis will typically then proceed to refer to a broad range of the alleged victim-group's sincerely held beliefs, values, and priorities, insofar as they can
properly be taken into account by courts and legislatures. It goes
without saying that a reviewing court is not to assess those affected religious beliefs, values, and priorities on their religious or
doctrinal merits or to endorse or reject distinctively religious
propositions.
But courts and legislatures can learn much that may be crucial
to the cost-benefit analysis of a policy, even before considering
costs and benefits of the policy from the standpoint of its proponents or third parties. Simply put, the genuine beliefs and values
of the alleged victims of religious persecution themselves will often be crucial to a cost-benefit analysis and certainly of greatest
interest for the purposes herein. In many cases, the allegedly or
actually persecuted group may believe on its own terms that the
government treatment in question is actually promoting for many

41. For a non-hypothetical example of essential contestability in the context of a nonbinding city council resolution, see Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City of
San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting an Establishment Clause violation claim based on the city council's opposition to Vatican directive to
local parishes on adoption policy).
More recently, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops addressed important
issues of religious liberty to highlight the "essential contestability" problem. Our First,
Most Cherished Liberty: A Statement on Religious Liberty, U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-actionlreligious-libertylupload
Our-First-Most-Cherished-Liberty-Apr12-6- 12-12.pdf [hereinafter Statement on Religious
Liberty]. The bishops' statement itself does not appear to explicitly come to terms with
well-known arguments that the religiously burdensome policies in question appropriately
further a range of arguably important rights and other government interests. Id. The
bishops' case that the rules in question amount to religious persecution, or other religious
rights violations, thus rests on the consequences of the rules from the standpoint of the
alleged victims, explicitly incorporating no meaningful response to the legislators' perspective. Id. For a discussion of generally how to approach some loosely related tradeoffs, see
R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of ConstitutionalValues: The Case of Free Speech
and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 527 (2006).
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the highest imaginable fulfillment and realization they can attain. Even state neutrality toward this and other private conceptions of the good life would not mean that the state may not adopt
policies that contribute to or take account of the fulfillment of
private group understandings of the good life.
C. Alleged Persecutionand Cost-Benefit Analyses
It is fair to wonder, though, how anyone could realistically perform any sort of cost-benefit analysis that takes account of the religious beliefs, values, and priorities of an allegedly persecuted religious group. Must not a cost-benefit analysis in this context be
at best crude and reductive? Yet to begin with, many important
religious groups clearly undertake their own authoritative costbenefit analyses on their own value-terms, if not in so many
words.
Consider for example the ancient text entitled "The Martyrdom
of Polycarp."' 2 Referring to Polycarp and a group of other martyrs,
the author declares that "they despised the tortures of the world,
thus purchasing eternal life at the price of a single hour."4 This
amounts to a simple, if dramatic, cost-benefit analysis. However
extreme the context, this mostly qualitative weighing, balancing,
implied commensuration, and decisive judgment are all that are
needed for the sorts of cost-benefit analyses considered herein.
It might be said that persecution cannot possibly amount to
anything but a pure "cost" for the victims, and generally a large
cost at that. Perceived persecutions are indeed typically feared,
avoided, and resisted. But as the quotation above concerning Polycarp" already begins to suggest, this need not always be the

42. The Martyrdom of Polycarp, in THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS 151 (Ludwig Schopp et al.
eds., Francis X. Glinn trans., 1947).

43. Id. at ch. 2 (alteration in original). In more complex cases, we may be able to adopt
orders or hierarchies of infinite values, and in that sense compare them. It hardly seems
unreasonable to conclude that, all else equal, it is more valuable, or creates greater benefit, to send five persons to infinite bliss than to send only one of those five. But trading off
one or more persons' infinite value against the loss of infinite value by one or more other

persons might require the input not only of the affected parties and their relevant beliefs,
but the tradeoff rates adopted by governments. In some theologies, infinite value may
mean something like absolute value, in the sense of value not subject to exchange, except
where one inexchangeable value tragically conflicts with another, and where a choice must
be made, perhaps on the basis of the sheer number of persons on both sides. See GUIDO
CALABRESI & PHILI BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 26-27 (1978).
44. The Martyrdom of Polycarp,supra note 42, 152.
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case, given a group's espoused values and priorities. Perceived or
actual persecutions can confer or amount to immense benefits on
the value schemes of those persecuted.
Consider as a secular and controversial analogy one of Winston
Churchill's best known public declarations. Churchill famously
raised the possibility that history would judge that the "British
Empire and the Commonwealth," despite the massive destruction, deprivation, and the deaths and injuries endured during the
Nazi air campaign, were actually experiencing "their finest
hour."45 Churchill's reference was to the judgment of others,"6 but
this reference could also have been intended to reflect at least
some contemporary British judgments as well, in light of British
character, virtues, values, and priorities. This is not to claim that
Churchill was in fact expressing the then current sentiments of
the British public. All that needs to be claimed is that he conceivably could have been doing so, despite the dreadful suffering and
privation. Possible religious analogues, on generally lesser scales,
are considered below.
D. Some Relevant Limits On Cost-Benefit Analyses
Generally, it will not be appropriate for a legislature or court to
seize upon some marginal, dissident, or novel belief, articulated
perhaps only in a moment of emotional fervor, in order to portray
the religious costs imposed by a government policy or rule as negative or only minimal. There will also be cases in which the authenticity of a victim's reaction to alleged persecution is unclear.
But in many other instances, that authenticity of belief will be
well-documented, unambiguous, and clearly within the religious
group's well-established general norms. Such a response can thus
be said to reflect the group's genuine teachings, clear aspirations,
values, and priorities. This is so even if some group members understandably fall short of their own standards under the pressures of the moment.47 All humans are subject to self-professed

45. Their Finest Hour, supranote *.For an audio version, see Churchill: 'TheirFinest
Hour' BBC (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.bbc.co.uk/schoolradio/subjects/history/ww2clips/
speeches/churchillfinesthour.
46. Their Finest Hour, supra note *
47. A group's valuation of martyrdom, for example, need not be entirely negated by a
group member whose best intentions are, under great stress, not matched by their resolve,
due to weakness of the will. See generally ALFRED R. MELE, BACKSLIDING:
UNDERSTANDING WEAKNESS OF THE WILL (2012) (providing a general discussion of weak-
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weakness of the will, backsliding, cowardice, or other unjustified
reactions.
Also consider a more controversial limitation on a responsive
cost-benefit analysis. It would typically be inappropriate for a
court, when sentencing an allegedly persecuted victim in an otherwise standard criminal case, to impose an enhanced penalty on
the grounds that on the defendant's own value system, the defendant has gained enormously important spiritual goals in violating a law-or in being severely sentenced. This is in some respects a close call. The defendant's lack of remorse may indeed
properly be considered in sentencing.8 And courts may seek in
general to make punishments somehow meaningful. But taking a
defendant's religious values into account in criminal sentencing
threatens to spiral out of control from a standpoint of overall systemic fairness. Criminal sentencing is in some respects unlike
typical government programs. Formal equality across cases in the
criminal sentencing context is an especially important value. The
ability to compare the lengths of two defendants' sentences is typically clear and of special moral importance. In other policy contexts, various sorts of inequality of impact are unavoidable.
Someone who is disinclined to register with the Selective Service, for example, on grounds of inconvenience, political preference, or fear of potential social consequences might well be effectively motivated to register if faced with the realistic prospect of
even a modest fine.49 But compare the case of a religious pacifist
who sincerely believes that as the degree of punishment for nonregistration increases, even unto death, the spiritual benefits
even for that defendant alone increase proportionately. A life sentence, prolonged torture, or even the death penalty might seem,
on some otherwise generally sensible punishment theory, 0 oddly
proportionate and appropriate in such a case, and might even
perversely enhance the defendant's authentic spiritual "gains"

willed action in various contexts.).
48. See, e.g., Burr v. Pollard, 546 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2008); Bergmann v.
McCaughtry, 65 F.3d 1372, 1379 (7th Cir. 1995).
49. Without at all presuming to assess the defendant's motivations, see McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), for a sense of some possible tradeoffs.
50. But consider the critique of deterrence theory articulated in Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its
Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950-51 (2003). See also H.J. McCloskey,
Utilitarianand Retributive Punishment, 64 J. PHIL. 91 (1967) (critiquing utilitarian justifications for punishment and advocating a retributive theory).
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from refusing to register in the first place.5' Those sentences
would of course depart too grotesquely from quantitative equality
among various defendants in sentencing. In other regulatory contexts, though, courts can take any freely admitted religious costs
and benefits into account, in appropriate cases, up until it is clear
that the law is no longer taking defensible account of the claim of
all persons to equal treatment and the equal protection of the
laws.
Realistically, the criminal justice system cannot sustain as a
common practice a sentence of a modest fine for one defendant
and life imprisonment or even death for another defendant who
has committed the same offense with the same degree of public
harm, awareness, and intentionality. Even the mere appearance
of gross disparities counts for much in sentencing. Official costbenefit analyses that incorporate a group's religious values are
instead more appropriate in deciding, within the limits of the Establishment Clause, among alternative reasonable government
policies and enforcement mechanisms. In such contexts, some
significant public interest may well be meaningfully advanced, in
ways not otherwise available, by a policy which clearly restricts
the religious liberty of the adversely affected group. In such contexts, governments can generally be more open to inclusive, publicly explainable, and well-reasoned interest-balancing and costbenefit analyses.
E. A Non-Religious Comparison Case: When Should Judges
Consider PossibleBenefits to Speakers in Restricting Those
Speakers?
Many alleged religious persecution cases will significantly differ from the typical cases in which a speaker is punished or restrained based on the content of the speech. 2 This can be true
even though some cases of alleged religious persecution may be

51. These gains could include some of the considerations discussed infra Section V.
One complication is that on some religious views, deliberately taking the initiative and
actively seeking what would otherwise be readily and properly avoidable punishment may
not result in significant spiritual benefits. See infra Section IV. And in theory, a defendant
who continues to receive an increasingly great spiritual payoff as the sentence becomes
even more cruel might create unsolvable problems in arriving at some single determinate,
uniquely appropriate sentence.
52. See generally R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-NeutralRegulation of
Speech: The Limitationsof a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 333-35 (2006).
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based largely on what the victim has said or refused to say.53 One
crucial point of distinction between these two kinds of cases is
that in a religious persecution case, the persecution itself may, on
the victim's own value-system, be of immense, if not infinite, affirmative value for the victim, if not also for others.54 In the more
typical content-based speech restriction case, in contrast, any
benefits accruing to the speaker from punishment of the speech
will be limited.
It is certainly possible to argue that serious political speechbased punishment of, say, a Vaclav Havel" might have the effect
of benefiting the regulated speaker by strengthening the victim's
character, attracting attention to his writings, inspiring further
writing, or even contributing in some respects to the victim's
long-term self-realization. But to say in the typical such victim's
own non-religious terms that a regulated speaker is substantially,
if not infinitely, better off because of the imprisonment will usually not seem plausible on the best understandings of freedom of
speech.
John Stuart Mill classically argued that freedom of speech specifically and social freedoms more generally contribute to selfrealization, autonomy, or self-fulfillment." Mill doubtless recognized that adversity, at least short of death, can strengthen one's
public and private character. But for Mill, there is the sense that
persecuting individuals or groups on the basis of the content of
their words will often substantially promote the flourishing of individual personality, in otherwise unattainable ways that substantially outweigh the costs to the persecuted speakers. 7 This
understanding may not hold in religious persecution cases. These
religious contexts specifically now must be discussed.

53. Note, for example, the nature of the charges and options legally available to Polycarp and his fellow martyrs. The Martyrdom of St. Polycarp,supra note 42, at 155-57.
54. See infra Section V. Whether the persecution is strictly necessary, practically necessary, uniquely opportune, or by itself sufficient in obtaining that immense value will depend on the circumstances and theologies involved.
55. See VAcLAv HAVEL, OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1965-1990 (Paul Wilson
ed., 1991).
56, See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. III, 53-57 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859).
See also, e.g., Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 443, 443-44, 498-99 (1988) (discussing the "connection between speech and
self' in the legal context).
57. See Mill, supra note 56, at ch. III, 53-59. There can, of course, be cases of secular
free speech "martyrs," in the sense that their imprisonment for unacceptable political
speech builds public sympathy for them, if not greater interest in their views.
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III. ALLEGED RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE AMERICAN
CONTEXT: SOME CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS

This section does not yet offer any substantive considerations
that might enter into an alleged persecution cost-benefit analysis.
The aim is instead to first establish the relevance of such a costbenefit analysis in the American context. Necessarily, the examples will be extremely selective.
As it turns out, physical persecution on religious grounds by
government officials is not entirely alien to American constitutional history. Just before the Civil War, for example, an elevenyear-old Boston public school student was whipped for a half-hour
on his eventually bleeding hands with a three-foot rattan rod. 3
The student's offense was that he refused to read not the Ten
Commandments in general, but only the officially endorsed version thereof, because of his family's religious beliefs.59 The assistant principal who administered the whipping was arrested and
charged with assault and battery, but the charges were later
dismissed."0
Persecution of a quasi-official, or social, sort has also historically occurred. It has taken the form of, for example, a jury acquittal, as in the case of the killing of Father James E. Coyle in Birmingham, Alabama in 1921.61 This case involved race and
ethnicity as much as religion, along with distinct Klan associations. 2 The defense attorney who successfully obtained an acquittal for the admitted shooter of Father Coyle was the youthful Hugo Black, years before his elevation to the United States Supreme
Court. 3
Alleged deprivations of American religious liberty are not,
however, confined either to anecdote or to history. Consider the
sheer number of charge receipts recently filed under Title VII on
religion-based employment discrimination grounds. In 1997, the

58.

DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 156 (2011).

59. Id.
60. Id. One could attribute the whipping to the student's "insubordination," but it is
hard to imagine any religious persecution case that could not be refrained as a case of insubordination or disobedience.
61. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 424-26 (2002).
62. See id. at 425.
63. See id. at 425-26, 429.
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number of such claims was 1709.64 By the year 2011, the number
of such claims had reached an annual total of 4151.5 The per-

centage of such cases administratively determined to reflect "no
reasonable cause" remained reasonably steady at about sixty percent or slightly higher throughout this period.66
More broadly, however, the idea of impending official religious
persecution in the contemporary American context has of late
been raised with increasing conspicuousness and frequency.67 Religious persecution of various degrees anticipated or allegedly already manifested, is said to have taken on unprecedented dimensions.68 Thus, for example, under current circumstances, "we have
bishops talking of martyrdom from the pulpit."6 9
Among the most vivid such contemporary statements is that of
Francis Cardinal George, Archbishop of Chicago. In 2010, Cardinal George indicated that "I expect to die in bed, my successor
will die in prison and his successor will die a martyr in the public
square."' Bishop Fabian Bruskewitz of Lincoln, Nebraska has also declared that "[like the martyrs of old, we must be prepared to
accept '71suffering which could include heavy fines and imprisonment."

64. Religion-Based Charges FY 1997-FY 2011, EEOC, www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
65. Id.
66. For further discussion, see, for example, BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE
PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY 58-59 (2011). Of course, not every actual violation by private or public parties of
a statutory or constitutional religious right will be counted as "persecution." More generally, though, Grim and Finke argue that "to the extent that governments and societies restrict religious freedoms, physical persecution and conflict increase." Id. at 222. For examples of interesting religious liberty cases in the private sector employment context, see
Harrellv. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 2011) and Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627
F.3d 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2010).
67. See, e.g., Elizabeth Westhoff, Ever-Increasing Attacks on Church Calling Us to
Martyrdom, ST. LOUIS REV. (Feb. 16, 2012, 10:15 PM), http://stlouisreview.comlprint/234
04.
68. See, e.g., id.
69. Id.
70. John Zuhlsdorf, Religious Persecution and Martyrdom, FR. Z'S BLOG-WHAT DOES
THE PRAYER REALLY SAY? (Feb. 21, 2012), http://wdtprs.comlblog/2012/02/religious-perse
cution-and-martyrdom/.
71. Benjamin Mann, Lincoln Bishop: Prepare for 'Suffering' Under HHS Mandate,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.catholicnewsagency.connews/lincoln-

bishop-tells-catholics-to-prepare-for-suffering-under-hhs-mandate/;
see also Hillary Senour, Denver Archbishop: HHS Mandate an Attempt to Remove Religion from Society,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (June 1, 2012), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/Denver
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More analytically, Archbishop Thomas Wenski of Miami has
expressed the view that recent "efforts to restrict religious liberty
are seemingly founded in a reductive secularism that has more in
common with the French Revolution than with America's founding."7 Cardinal Raymond L. Burke more concisely "thinks persecution may be looming" and can envision arrests for preaching
the faith. 3 Father Paul D. Scalia" of the Diocese of McLean, Virginia has indicated that if religious persecution arises, the appropriate response is that of a conscious imitation of the martyr St.
Thomas More. 5
A number of official religious bodies,76 religious figures,77 and
others8 have recently offered related analyses. 9 Again, the point
is not that such persons are objectively correct in their assess-

-archbishop-hhs-mandate-an-attempt-to-remove-religion-from-society/ (internal quotation
marks omitted) ("If we become martyrs, so be it.").
72. Op-Ed, Government Can't Impose Practices on Catholic Church, SUN SENTINEL,
Apr. 23, 2012, at 15A ("[F]reedom of religion ... is under great stress if not under outright
assault.").
73. David Kerr, Cardinal Burke Reflects on his First Year in the Sacred College,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/cardi
nal-burke-reflects-on-his-first-year-in-the-sacredcollege/.
74. Father Scalia is the son of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. See Catholics
Urged to Imitate St. Thomas More in ContraceptionBattle, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Apr.
9, 2012), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholics-urged-to-imitate-st.-thomasmore-in -contraception -battle.
75. See id. For the sentiments of Thomas More himself, see 9 THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF ST. THOMAS MORE (J.B. Trapp ed., Yale Univ. Press, 1979). See also Robert Bolt, A Man
for All Seasons (First Vintage Int'l ed., 1990) (1960).
76. See, e.g., Administrative Committee, United for Religious Freedom, U.S. CONF. OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://usccb.orglissues-and-action/religious-liberty/
upload/Admin-Religious-Freedom.pdf; Statement on Religious Liberty, supra note 41.
77. See, e.g., CHARLES CI-TAPUT, A HEART ON FIRE: CATHOLIC WITNESS AND THE NEXT
AMERICA (2012); Fr.Dwight Longnecker's Sobering Reflection on The Coming Persecution,'
www.catholic.org/national/national-story.php?id=45102 (Mar. 11, 2012) (predicting that
"[tihe recusants will find it strangely difficult to get or keep a job. They'll end up impoverished and outside the mainstream," while also forecasting acquiescence and conformity on
the part of the majority); Matt Palmer, Cardinal-DesignateO'Brien Says Archdiocese
Won't Comply With "Unjust" HHS Law, CATHOLIC REVIEW (Jan. 25, 2012), www.catholic
review.org/article/home/cardinal-designate-o-brien-says-archdiocese-won-t-comply-withunjust-HHS-law-3.
78. See, e.g., Russell Shaw, The Persecution Has Begun, PATHEOS (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.patheos.com/Resources/Additional-Resources/Persecution-of-Religion-Has-Be
gun-Russell-Shaw-11-16-2011.html.
79. For a parallel concern expressed for the continent of Europe, see the remarks of
the United Kingdom's Baroness Warsi. Warsi's Speech on 'Militant Secularism' in Full,
POLITICS.CO.UK (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.politics.co.uklcomment-analysis/2012/02/14/
warsi-s-speech-on-militant-secularism-in-full ("Let us be honest: Too often there is a suspicion of faith in our continent ...where faith is sidelined, marginalized and downgraded.").
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ments. All the logic the argument requires is that some persons
claiming some degree of religious persecution, of themselves or of
some fellow religious adherents, believe that such persecution is
taking place, or may take place, based on their own perspectives.
The claim of religious persecution is also implied by highprofile contemporary American judicial cases. Consider the language of a number of challenges to the widely discussed federal
regulations promulgated pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act.8" For example, the complaint filed by
Colorado Christian University asserts that "[t]he government's
Mandate unconstitutionally coerces Colorado Christian to violate
its deeply held religious beliefs under threat of heavy fines and
penalties."81 More elaborately, the complaint alleges that
because the government acted with full knowledge of those beliefs,
and because it allows plans not to cover these services for a wide
range of reasons other than religion, the Mandate can be interpreted
as nothing other than a deliberate attack by the government on the
religious beliefs of Colorado Christian and millions of other Ameri82
cans.

Similar language of "deliberate attack" 3 on religious beliefs
with the potential for substantial fines is found as well in the
parallel complaint filed by Belmont Abbey College in the case of
Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius.s4 Related complaints refer as
well to the "threat of heavy fines and [other] penalties." 5 While
the imposition of heavy fines on the basis of religion, at least from
the religious entity's perspective, may not be the gravest form of
religious persecution,86 such penalties, on the victim's assump-

80. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25,
26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
81. Complaint at 1, Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 1:11-cv-03350-CMA-BNB
(D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2011); see also Complaint at 1, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v.
Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-02542-BMC (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2012); Complaint at
95-99, Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-00815-ABJ (D.D.C. May 21, 2012).
82. Complaint, Colo. Christian Univ., supra note 81, at 3; see also Complaint at 1,
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12-cv-00253-JTM-CAN (N.D. Ind. May 21, 2012)
("overbearing and oppressive governmental action"); Complaint, Roman Catholic Archdiocese, supra note 81, at 1.
83. Complaint, Colo. Christian Univ., supra note 81, at 3.
84. Complaint at 3, Belmont Abbey Col. v. Sebelius, No. 1:11-cv-01989-GK (D.D.C.
Sept. 5, 2012); see also First Amended Complaint at 17, Eternal Word Television Network
v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00501-SLB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2012).
85. See Complaint at 3, Ave Maria Univ. v. Sebelius, No 2:12-cv-00088-JES-SPC
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012); Complaint, Colo. ChristianUniv., supranote 81, at 2.
86. But see supra notes 1-2, 19-21 (discussing martyrdom in general and the various
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tions, would presumably lie somewhere on the spectrum of alleged religious persecution, and thus within the scope of the general concerns herein.
IV. SOME DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS OF RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION TO VICTIMS AND TO OTHERS
It is no surprise that most of the costs to the victims of alleged
religious persecution are more obvious than any accompanying
substantial benefits to the victim. Our brief examination of religious persecution cases in the immigration context confirms some
of the possible costs of what the recipient takes to be religious
persecution.87 The costs can certainly be horrific. The range of
commonly encountered costs may include death, maiming, various forms of torture, physical injury, beatings, burdensome fines,
imprisonment, detention, brutal interrogations, exile or geographic displacement, mistreatment of relatives and family members,
forced conversion, coercive indoctrination, imposed unemployment or underemployment, and various other forms of punitive
official and social discrimination and disenfranchisement.8 More
abstractly, there may be loss of freedom, physical and emotional
trauma, spiritual isolation, and the loss of familial and social
support systems.8 9
Additionally, the costs to the victims of alleged persecution
may overlap with some of the harms associated with deprivation
of freedom of speech in general, as depicted by John Stuart Mill,
among others. 0 At the individual level, not being permitted to
openly and publicly discuss religious matters, or to freely prose-

degrees of martyrdom).
87. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text; see also Catholic University Files
Suit to Block HHS Mandate, CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM. (May 21, 2012), http://public affairs.cua.edu/releases/2012/hhs -suit.cfm (Statement of President John Garvey) ("Unless
we can get judicial relief, we will soon have to take steps to conform to a rule we view as
immoral.").
88. See supra notes 1-2, 19-21. Each of these forms of persecutions would move the
scales on even the crudest forms of a Eenthamite hedonic calculus. See Jeremy Benthan, A
Fragment on Government, in SELECTED WRITING ON UTILITARIANISM 28 (2000) (1776)

("The only consequences that men are interested in, what are they but pain and pleasure?").
89. Rachel Sing-Kiat Ting & Terni Watson, Is Suffering Good? An Explorative Study
on the Religious PersecutionAmong Chinese Pastors,35 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 202, 202
(2007) (offering interview-based evidence).
90. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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lytize, could involve dignitary harms and a suppression of the
process of self-realization as classically described by Mill.9 '
If the alleged persecution in a given case is unexpected, that
unexpected character might either increase or decrease the psychological costs of such persecution. For some religious groups,
living in a relatively tolerant, liberal democracy may reduce any
dread or anxiety over merely possible future religious persecution. But if perceived religious persecution then actually occurs,
the very unexpectedness of the persecution may produce a jarring
sense of dissonance and dislocation. These costs may actually be
reduced among those who, in contrast, long anticipate the realistic possibility of persecution. 2 For example, while he was under
house arrest and awaiting execution, Boethius classically wrote
that "it is no ...surprise if on the ocean of life we are buffeted by
storms ...

,

for our chief aim is to displease the wicked." 3

Even where expected, the costs of religious persecution may be
either obvious or subtle. As for the obvious sort, consider the observation of Archbishop Oscar Romero in his last sermon just before his assassination: "Today we are passing to our liberation
through a desert strewn with bodies and where anguish and pain
are devastating us."9 4 As for the subtle sort, religious persecution
can sometimes evoke more nearly a sense of desolation than of
deliverance.9 '
From the perspective of the persecuted, there are also the substantial moral and spiritual costs of persecution or even of merely
the threat, chronic or acute, of religious persecution. These may
include the weakening or the actual takeover of religious and
broadly charitable institutions; succumbing to spiritual weakness; acts of cowardice and apostasy; rationalization and faintheartedness; and the conspicuous desertion or compromise of the
91.

Id. This is not to suggest that Mill denied that major religious denominations of-

ten tended to suppress individual creative and autonomous thought. See MILL,supra note
56, at chs. 2-3.
92. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1123-24.
93. BOETHUS,THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY 7 (P.G.Walsh trans., 2000).
94. Archbishop Oscar Romero, The Last Sermon (Mar. 14, 1980), in JAMES B.
NiCKOLOFF, THE CHURCH AND HUMAN LIBERATION: THE ECCLESIOLOGY OF GUSTAVO

GUTIERREZ (1989). The reference to "our liberation" already indicates that persecution,
even unto martyrdom, is not exclusively a matter of costs. See Section V, infra.
95. Consider the vision of Shusaku Endo. See SHUSAKU ENDO, SILENCE 92 (William
Johnston trans., 1970) ("What a miserable and painful business it was! The rain falls unceasingly on the sea. And the sea which killed them surges on uncannily-in silence.").
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faith, for the sake of worldly prosperity or accommodation." Of
course, in an age of alleged persecution, it may often be difficult
to sort out desertions of the faith due specifically to anticipated
persecution and desertions more meaningfully due to general cultural trends.97
There may also be spiritual costs of a more subtle, indirect sort.
What if the very steadfastness and devotion of the persecuted
leads, perhaps predictably, to even greater spiritual estrangement, resentment, or hostility on the part of the assumed persecutors?" Even if the persecuted have no share in any moral responsibility for such reactions, might these reactions not often
count as spiritual costs from the perspective of the persecuted?
More generally, the allegedly persecuted may view the persecution as spiritually harmful to the souls of the persecutors themselves.99 The alleged persecutors may, of course, deny that they
are corrupting their own souls or forfeiting paradise, and the
state should not reject those beliefs on the merits and conclude
otherwise.
Finally, and even more subtly, there are also the possible costs
of voluntarily-perhaps too eagerly-seeking out and undergoing
persecution "for the wrong reason."'' 0 In some theologies, actively
seeking persecution or martyrdom for the sake of personal glory,

96.

See MIDDLETON, supra note 1, at 77-78. The sheer number of those who desert or

compromise the faith to avoid persecution may loom large by comparison with those who
endure persecution steadfastly. See id. at 77.
97.

Cf. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: How RELIGION

DIVIDES AND UNITES US 23-27 (2010) (highlighting demographics of religious and nonreligious Americans).
98. See, e.g., The Letter of the Churches of Vienna and Lyons to the Churches of Asia
and Phrygia, in Medieval Sourcebook, FORDHAM UNIV., www.fordham.edu/halsall/source
/177-lyonsmartyrs.asp (last visited Dec. 10, 2012). It should be noted that the historical
veracity, or completeness, of accounts of persecution are generally inconsequential to our
purposes herein.
99. See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 49 (3d ed. 1950) (describing
Thomas Beckett's final sermon) ("We mourn, for the sins of the world that has martyred
....
").This is not to suggest either that such sins are, on every theology, irredeemable, or
that the persecutors in question otherwise would not be engaged in spiritually objectionable behavior of one sort or another.
100. See id. at 39-40, 44.
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honor, esteem,' or perhaps even for the sake of self-interestedly
conceived heavenly rewards may count as spiritual costs.02
Assessing human motivation, even in the most apparently altruistic0 3 or benevolent' cases, is notoriously difficult and uncertain. Friedrich Nietzsche famously expressed concern for the real
motives underlying martyrdom in his aphorism "he that humbleth himself wants to be exalted."'0 5 Nietzsche's view was that
the martyr died "out of ressentiment and a will to power ... an
example of self-exaltation [in embracing] death in order to possess power after death.' ' °
To the extent that Nietzsche has accurately characterized some
or all martyrs, then martyrdom involves the cultural costs Nie-

tzsche described, along with the moral or other costs to the martyr. Of course, the accuracy of Nietzsche's diagnosis of the moti-

vation for martyrdom is not beyond controversy.

7

But whether

Nietzsche is largely right about the personal and other costs of
martyrdom seems largely unresolvable as among secular and
non-secular world-views. Courts and legislatures have independ-

101.

See id. at 39-44.

102.

See also MICHAEL P. JENSEN, MARTYRDOM AND IDENTITY: THE SELF ON TRIAL 13

(2012) (2010) (discussing in particular Becket's Fourth Tempter).
103.

See generally THOMAS NAGEL, POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 3 (Princeton Univ. Press

1978) (1970) (arguing that "suspectibility to certain motivational influences, including altruism, is a condition of rationality.").
104. See JOSEPH BUTLER, FIVE SERMONS (Stephen Darwall ed., 1985) (1726) (developing sophisticated distinctions among selfish, self-interested, benevolent, and altruistic actions).
105.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN: A BOOK FOR FREE SPIRITS 48

(R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1986) (1878). For discussion of this concept, see Lawrence Cunningham, Christian Martyrdom:A Theological Perspective, in WITNESS OF THE BODY: THE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF CHRISTIAN MARTYRDOM 3, 4 (Michael L. Budde & Karen

Scott eds., 2011) and J. Warren Smith, Martyrdom: Self-Denial or Self-Exaltation?Motives
for Self-Sacrifice From Homer to Polycarp, A Theological Reflection, 22 MODERN
THEOLOGY 169, 170-71 (2006).

106. Cunningham, supra note 105, at 4. For an example of Nietzsche's reference to ressentiment, or, very roughly, spiteful, dishonest, resentful vengeance of the naturally weak
toward the naturally superior, see, for example, FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE
GENEALOGY OF MORALS 23-25 (Douglas Smith trans., 1996) (1887). The martyr actually
engages in what one might ironically view as an early "revaluation of all values." See, e.g.,
MIDDLETON, supra note 1, at 74 (describing the inversions of values of the early martyrs,
particularly in the context of the martyr Perpetua, "her day of suffering and death was in
actuality her day of triumph.").
107. See, e.g., JENSEN, supra note 102, at 155 (discussing the relevant theology of Augustine); Smith, supra note 105, at 172, 185 (referring in particular to the martyrdom of
Polycarp and its proper interpretation); Carole Straw, 'A Very Special Death": Martyrdom
in Its Classic Context, in SACRIFICING THE SELF: PERSPECTIVES ON MARTYRDOM AND

RELIGION 39, 41 (Margaret Cormack ed., 2001).
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ent reasons to take various costs of alleged persecution into proper account, along with the benefits discussed immediately below,
in setting public policy.
V. SOME DIRECT AND INDIRECT BENEFITS TO VICTIMS OF
RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN GENERAL
Being a sincere religious believer does not, by itself, establish
the attitude that one should take toward perceived religious persecution. Mainstream believers, however, often ask not for protection or for deliverance from persecution but instead for virtues
like faith, hope, patience, steadfastness, or courage in the face of
persecution. ' To ask not for avoidance of or relief from persecution but for the capacity to respond to persecution in the right
way is typically to concede, if not to embrace, the substantial spiritual value of persecution. A test, however stringent and painful,
can after all be an irreplaceable opportunity of great, even
unique, value.
Thus, in some mainstream religious views, perceived persecution can promote spiritual worthiness, endurance, character,
hope, spiritual boldness, joyfulness, the rewards of heaven, the
confirmation of the legitimacy of one's church, and can inspire repentance, increased steadfastness, and deeper conversion in other
persons." Interviews with contemporary victims of religious persecution have elaborated upon these ancient themes."0
These contemporary interviews and studies refer, for example,
to the experience of God's presence, surrender to God, and
stronger identification with the divine, along with greater discipleship and an enhanced sense of a higher purpose."' It is possible for someone to undergo any of these experiences in the absence of alleged persecution, and even in the absence of any sort
of suffering at all. But even if these valued experiences were no
108.

See, e.g., DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP 80 (R.H. Fuller &

Irmgard Booth trans., 1959) (1937) ("If we refuse to take up our cross and submit to suffering and rejection at the hands of men, we forfeit our fellowship with Christ and have
ceased to follow Him."); Sandro Magister, Blessed Are the Persecuted: The Lesson of the
Successor of Peter, (Apr. 23, 2012), http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/1350227?
engy (quoting Pope Benedict XVI, The Church Must Not Fear Persecutions (Apr. 18,
2012) (Joseph G. Trabbic trans.)).
109. See MIDDLETON, supranote 1, at 32 (citing a range of scriptural sources).
110. See Ting & Watson, shpra note 89, at 202.
111. See id.
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more likely under persecution than under some other imaginable
circumstances, which often seem doubtful, they could still count
as important benefits crucially attributable to the alleged religious persecution.
Less personally, those who suffer alleged persecution often believe that it is precisely-perhaps distinctively-their sufferings,
and their reactions thereto that can inspire initially distant or
hostile persons to become religious believers. 12 Apparently there
is evidence that this conversion-through-persecution effect characterizes other historical eras as well.113 Many of the persecuted
would see this unique effect as of immense value.
One recent victim of religious persecution offered a surprisingly
unequivocal and much broader endorsement of suffering for the
faith, however alien such thinking may be to cultures influenced
by unsophisticated forms of utilitarianism'14 or hedonism."' This
pastor summed up the concept in the following plainspoken, earnest, forthright terms:
So, is suffering good? Yes, extremely good. Through suffering we experience God. Through suffering we see God's glory. So the theology
of suffering is a must learn subject for all God's children. Don't escape. North American Christians try very hard to avoid it. Why? Because they don't know that suffering is a blessing." t

The sincerity, internal logic, and at least occasional orthodoxy
of such reactions illustrates again how perceived religious persecution can differ dramatically in its value, even to the persecuted,

112.

See id. at 206.

113.

See,

e.g.,

JOYCE

E.

SALISBURY,

THE

BLOOD

OF MARTYRS:

UNINTENDED

CONSEQUENCES OF ANCIENT VIOLENCE 1 (2004) (recounting examples of Christian martyrs
as intriguing, impressing, and leading to the conversion of many Romans during the first
three centuries of Christianity).
114. See, e.g., SIDGWICK, supra note 9.
115. See FRED FELDMAN, PLEASURE AND THE GOOD LIFE: CONCERNING THE NATURE,
VARIETIES, AND PLAUSIBILITY OF HEDONISM (2006). Less philosophically, and more critically, see NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF
SHOW BUSINESS (1985); JEAN M. TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM
EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF ENTITLEMENT (2010). See also Dan Weijers, Intuitive Biases in Judgments About Thought Experiments: The Experience Machine Revisited (Oct.
2, 2011), available at www.danweijers.com/pdf/The%20Experience%2OMachine%2oRevisi
ted%20-%2ODan%20Weijers.pdf (emphasizing the role of the status quo bias).
116. Ting & Watson, supra note 89, at 207. Among the authors' interview subjects,
"[m]any suffered emotionally when they felt abandoned by God or came face-to-face with
their personal weaknesses. However, there was an overwhelming validation of the suffering they all went through-all focused on the lessons learned, the insights gained, and the
joys experienced." Id. at 208.
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from other sorts of rights violations. The protection of free speech
and assembly rights generally promotes several important values,
including the self-realization opportunities of the speaker.' Racial discrimination and denial of equal protection, too, are rightly
thought to directly injure the parties discriminated against, if not

the politically dominant groups as well.18' This article has discovered that religious persecution can be dramatically different in its
costs and benefits.
Consider as well the recent reflections on the effects of religious
persecution by a twice-imprisoned victim of the late Romanian

regime:
Someone asked me if my sufferings in prison helped me in any way. I
answered, "No, they have not helped me, but I'm the result of this
suffering. If I do something, if I am anything, if you see something in
me, know that119it is because of suffering. Without this suffering, I
have nothing!"

Persecution can thus be seen as fundamentally constitutive of
one's very worth and identity, 20 above and beyond its various liberating and purifying effects.' More broadly and more socially,
religious persecution is often thought to result in greater unity

117.

See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Kent Greenawalt, Free

Speech Justifications,89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 126 (1989).
118. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963),

available at http://mlk-kppOl.stanford.edu/index.php/resources/article/annotated.letter.
Dr. King writes that racial segregation "gives the segregator a false sense of superiority
and the segregated a false sense of inferiority." Id. at para. 16. For broad background, see
G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 111-19 (A. V. Miller trans., 1977) (1807)

(discussing subservience and the relation between lords and servants in philosophical
terms).
119. GEORGE CALCIU, INTERVIEWS, HOMILIES, AND TALKS 332 (St. Herman of Alaska
Brotherhood ed., 2010).
120.
121.

See id.
See id. at 296; WILLIAM ULLATHORNE, PATIENCE AND HUMILITY 80 (1998) (1908)

("We may certainly obtain more grace and glory from God through persecution than
through kindness if we know how to use it rightly.").
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among otherwise diverse groups of the religiously committed, 122 in
addition to strengthening and fortifying the persecuted group. '
Some of the broader benefits of perceived religious persecution
may, however, be self-limiting as well as self-propagating. At the
time of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke concluded that
"[t]he robbery of your [French] church has proved a security to
the possession of ours. It has roused the people. They see with
horror and alarm that enormous and shameless act of proscription."'24 Thus some instances of persecution may have a sort of
"inoculation effect" on other parties, limiting the geographic
spread of both its costs and benefits.
But it is equally possible that religious persecution might have
a disinhibiting effect on other governments, perhaps creating
"demonstration effects," "viruses," or "contagions," in which formerly unthinkable persecutions become realistically "thinkable."'2 5 While it is difficult to be sure about such matters, it seems
possible, by analogy, that the various European political revolutions of 1848 cannot be fully accounted for with each taken in isolation.'26 Or perhaps the early repudiations of Soviet-style governments in Eastern Europe encouraged the later repudiations.'27
By loose analogy, it is not difficult to imagine both self-limiting
and self-propagating effects of religious persecutions, within and
beyond borders.

122.

See, e.g., Michael Nazir-Ali, 5 ECOLESIOLOGY 250, 254 (2009) (reviewing THE

SUFFERING BODY: RESPONDING TO THE PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS (Harold D. Hunter &

Cecil M. Robert, Jr. eds., 2006)) ("It may be that persecution will lead to that unity which
we have all been praying for but which has eluded professional ecumenists and church
bureaucrats these many years."). In a metaphorical, or perhaps more profound, sense, the
former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky referred to "a mystical feeling of the interconnection of human souls [across time and space] forged in the gloomy prison-camp
world...." NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR No EVIL 356 (Stefani Hoffman trans., 1998) (1988).

123. Consider the Third Priest's speech: "[T]he Church is... triumphant in adversity ...fortified by persecution." ELIOT, supra note 99, at 84. For comparison, see Alfred
Lord Tennyson, Becket act V (1884).
124.
125.

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 131 (1906) (1790).
Cf. SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1999) (discussing the phenomenon

of Internet viral videos, computer viruses, or self-replicating memes that rapidly spread
information and social phenomena like viruses).
126.
127.

See, e.g., MIKE RAPPORT, 1848: YEAR OF REVOLUTION (2008).
See CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS: FROM

COMMUNISM

TO

DEMOCRACY 22-25 (Sharon L. Wolchik & Jane L. Curry eds., 2008) (discussing the collapse
of communism throughout Eastern Europe); TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE MAGIC LANTERN:
THE REVOLUTION OF '89 WITNESSED IN WARSAW, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, AND PRAGUE 78

(1990) (reviewing the Eastern European political climate and government transitions following the Cold War).
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The benefits to victims, and indirectly to others, of alleged religious persecutions can also be viewed from the perspective of the
particular virtues evoked or inspired by such persecution. Consider for example the widely valued virtues of courage and fortitude.2 8 For a number of religious groups, courage and fortitude
are valued not merely in their own right, but in the extreme, for
their linkage to the willingness and ability to withstand persecution even unto martyrdom. 2 9
Here, among many other possible cases, is an instance of courage enabling the invaluable witness, from the religious group's
perspective, of innocent, conscientious suffering unto death:
One of the policemen who had helped to hunt him down ...walked
up to the priest and with tears in his eyes begged Fr. Pro to forgive
him. [Fr. Pro] put his arm around the shoulders of the shaking
man
'3
and said, "You have not only my forgiveness but my thanks."' 0

Or consider the sustained courage and fortitude of Sister Dorothy Stang, who worked on land reform and environmental issues
in Brazil despite repeated threats until the moment of her assassination:

128. See THOMAs AQUINAS, TREATISE ON THE VIRTUES 57 (John A. Oesterle trans. 1966)
(1984) (highlighting "fortitude, a disposition by which the soul is strengthened for that
which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by
any operations"); PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE 8 (1952) (discussing St. Ambrose's
views on courage as "the strength of the soul to win victory in ultimate danger, like those
martyrs of the Old Testament"); see also DOUGLAS N. WALTON, COURAGE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (1986) (featuring numerous illustrative anecdotes in
broader contexts); N.J.H. Dent, The Value of Courage, 56 PHIL. 574 (1981) (considering
courage a cardinal virtue); Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, The Two Faces of Courage, 61 PHIL.
151 (1986) (defining courage as a way to overcome life's obstacles); Nancy L. Schwartz,
"Dreadedand Dared:" Courage as a Virtue, 36 POLITY 341 (2004) (noting that courage is
necessary to survive persecution).
129. See JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES 117 (Daniel F. Coogan trans.
1964) ("The essential and the highest achievement of fortitude is martyrdom .. "); see
also HANS URS VON BALTI-IASAR, LOVE ALONE IS CREDIBLE 116-17 (D.C. Schindler trans.
2004) (1963) ("Love ... means unconditional commitment, which implicitly (that is, when
necessary) includes a willingness to go all the way to one's death .... ); Straw, supra note
107, at 44; EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA, HISTORY OF THE MARTYRS IN PALESTINE 2 (William
Cureton trans., 1861), available at www.tertullian.org/fathers/eusebiusmartyrs.htm.
130. ANN BALL, BLESSED MIGUEL PRO: 20TH CENTURY MEXICAN MARTYR 79-80 (1996)
(emphasis added). Note, in the context of the costs and benefits of religious persecution,
that the persecuting government encouraged official photographs of the multiple executions by firing squad, but in light of the photographed behavior of the martyrs, "made the
possession of the photographs a crime." Id. at 81. For a sense of the relevant circumstances through the technique of the novel, see GRAHAM GREENE, THE POWER AND THE GLORY
(R.W.B. Lewis & Peter J. Conn eds., 1970) (1940).
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Dorothy stood up again. [One of her two assassins] asked if she had
a weapon. She answered that the only weapon she had was her Bible, which she immediately produced from her bag. She read a passage about how God left all things for everyone to use, and then she
read from the Beatitudes ... 131

For many religious groups, displays of virtues, including courage or fortitude, in circumstances of persecution are of incalculable spiritual value for the persecuted victim. But that need not
exhaust the value of such conspicuous virtue for the religious
group. The broader religious group and the direct victim of persecution may well believe, as suggested above," 2 that perceived religious persecution will result, however unintentionally, 3 ' in the
spiritual or even worldly advancement of the persecuted group.
This can be a matter of clear doctrine, not mere bravado or rationalization. Whether the doctrinal elements of any such belief
are sound on the merits is, of course, beyond the state's official
assessment under the Establishment Clause.'34
Thus some religious groups may well hold that in the classic
language of the early theologian Tertullian, "[t]he more you mow
us down, the thicker we rise, the Christian blood you spill is like
the seed you sow."3 5 Of course, an allegedly persecuting government may view any such unintended propagation effect as in various respects costly. But for some religious groups, this propagation effect will also be considered a vital benefit in various ways.
Religious groups need not be overly optimistic. The majority of religious group members may, in the end, abandon all resistance,
let alone martyrdom. The threat of repression may well induce
more craven submission, or passivity, than meaningful re-

131. ROSEANNE MURPHY, MARTYR OF THE AMAZON: THE LIFE OF SISTER DOROTHY
STANG 141-42 (2007).
132. See generally supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.

133. See, e.g., BALL, supranote 130, at 81 (highlighting the official re-calculation of the
propaganda value of the photographic record of the martyrdom).
134.

Classically, see the broad language of Justice Robert Jackson in the free speech

and free exercise case West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in ... religion, or other matters of

opinion....").
135. TERTULLIAN, THE APOLOGY OF TERTULLIAN 143 (W. Reeve, A.M. trans., London,
Newberry House 1889); see THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 73 (Robert M. Adams rev. trans., 1992)
(1516) (noting of the Utopian populace: "after they had heard from us the.., marvelous
devotion of the many martyrs who shed their blood to draw nations far and wide into the
Christian fellowship, you would not believe how they were impressed") Straw, supra note
107, at 49.
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sistance. These choices may have their own perhaps substantial
spiritual costs, especially if those who (voluntarily) submit would
have otherwise taken a spiritually crucially superior path.
But there is even here one further complication. As one contemporary author suggests, perhaps "the very fact that so many
[early Christians in Rome] lacked the courage to become martyrs' led to an enhanced respect for those Christians who did
' If so, this
stand firm."137
may have increased the worldly influence
over time of the most orthodox believers among an allegedly persecuted group. This development, too, could count as a substantial benefit from the perspective of the allegedly persecuted
group.
Martyrdom is the extreme response to alleged religious persecution. Obviously, many instances of alleged persecution do not
involve the threat or actuality of death, and death is obviously
distinctive. But even the extreme cases of martyrdom can further
inform an understanding of the legitimately cognizable costs, and
the immense, if not infinite, benefits of some lesser instances of
alleged religious persecution to the victim group.
The admittedly non-intuitive idea that being put to death for
one's beliefs may not, all things considered, be genuinely harmful
to the condemned party did not originate with the Roman martyrs. Socrates clearly presented such a view some five hundred
years earlier, although he also warned of the serious moral harms
done by his accusers to themselves.'38 Developing Socratic themes
already expounded in the Crito,"' martyrs such as Ignatius of Antioch and Polycarp concluded that they might well do more genuine good in and through their death in persecution than by otherwise living out their years."'

136. The very idea of a "martyr," in its original sense, apparently refers to a public witness for the faith. See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 450-51 (Gerald G. Walsh & Daniel Honan trans., 1964).
137. SALISBURY, supra note 113, at 21-22; see also MIDDLETON, supra note 1, at 62
(noting that tranquility in the face of death was occasionally intended to favorably impress
onlookers).
138. See Plato, The Apology, in EUTHYnHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO §§ xviii at 30, xxxiii at 48,
49 (Rachana Kamtekar ed., 2005).
139. See id. at 68.
140. See Tripp York, Early Church Martyrdom: Witnessing For or Against the Empire?,
in WITNESS OF THE BODY, supra note 105, at 20, 36. On Polycarp, see Leonard L. Thompson, The Martyrdom of Polycarp:Death in the Roman Games, 82 J. RELIG. 27 (2002). Neither the religious group nor the state need assume that those who endure persecution, or
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This is not to suggest that all voluntary religious martyrdom is
motivated by a desire for benefits, personal or collective. A martyr
could be motivated by a sense of fittingness or gratitude, or a desire for a closer unity with the divine, for purification, or to make
some sort of repayment, rather than by benefits in any standard
sense. 4 ' Fulfilling these aims could be considered of immense, if
not infinite, value. As noted above, they could be properly accompanied by a sense of joy or of triumph1 4 2 consistent with the various anticipated benefits'43 to the victim and to others.
V. CONCLUSION
Much of this argument for a legislature or court to take into legitimate account the immense, if not infinite, benefits uniquely
derivable from religious persecution, from the perspective of those
who believe themselves to be persecuted, may seem, however
coldly logical, to still be somehow worrisome, even if not constitutionally inappropriate. There can be no casual assumption, however, that the details of the current constitutional case law of religious freedom offer the final moral or logical touchstone. As
Professor Steven D. Smith has argued-in an entirely different
context--"[t]he assumptions and rationales that gave rise to our

those who somehow avoid it, would have led a life of "neutral" spiritual character, before
or after any instances of persecution.
141. See MARILYN MCCORD ADAMS, HORRENDOUS EVILS AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD
156 (1999) ("[R]eligious martyrs transform their tortured deaths from degrading occasions
of victimization into acts of worship by offering themselves in sacrifice to God."); Martyrdom of Ignatius, in 1 ANTI-NICENE FATHERS 129 (Alexander Roberts & James Donaldson
eds., 1995) (1885), available at http:/lwww.ccel.orglccel/schaff/anfOl/ ("[H]e inwardly reflected, that the confession which is made by martyrdom, would bring him into a yet more
intimate relation to the Lord."); Martyrdom of Polycarp, in 1 ANTI-NICENE FATHERS, supra, at 41 ("[flt is well for me to be changed from what is evil to what is righteous.");
ORIGEN: AN EXHORTATION TO MARTYRDOM 59 (Rowan A. Greer trans. 1979).
142. For reference to these elements of the classic martyrdom of Perpetua, see THE
MARTYRDOM OF PERPETUA 31 (W.H. Shewring ed., 1996 (1931); The Passion of Perpetua
and Felicity, in 3 ANTE.NICENE FATHERS, supra note 141, at 704; Mary R. Lefowitz, The
Motivations for St. Perpetua'sMartyrdom, 44 J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. 417 (1976) (discussing
various forms of personal and relational liberation and empowerment).
143. Consider, without assuming the reliability of any detailed account, the report of
The Martyrdom of Justin Martyr, in I ANTI-NiCENE FATHERS, supra note 141, at 306
("Rusticus the prefect said, 'Do you suppose, then, that you will ascend into heaven to receive some recompense?' Justin said, 'I do not suppose it, but I know and am fully persuaded of it."'). We should emphasize that cost-benefit analyses, in some appropriate form,
are not denied to anyone who recognizes that some values can be characterized not only as
immense, but as genuinely infinite. See supra notes 6. For the classic work of Georg Cantor, see Joseph Dauben, Georg Cantor and Pope Leo XIII Mathematics, Theology, and the
Infinite, 38 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 85-91 (1977).
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distinctive constitutional commitments have been forgotten, or
rejected, or ruled inadmissible," leaving us with a constitutional
' It should
law of "empty convention."144
come as no surprise then,
that the case law of religious freedom commonly yields unsatisfactory analyses and outcomes, however it is deployed. Nor are
the details of that law beyond critique. The arguments raised
herein should be assessed not on the basis of their novelty or unfamiliarity but on the basis of their merits.

144.

Steven D. Smith, Book Review, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious

Freedom, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1869, 1907 (2009) (reviewing KENT GREENWALT, RELIGIOUS
AND THE CONSTITUTION VOLUME 2: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008)).

